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Reforming Health Reform: Revisiting the Process of
Governance
John D. Blumi
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is
arguably the most ambitious piece of health legislation enacted
since the passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 2 The law
creates a massive extension of federal health insurance through
subsidies and mandates, ushers in multiple reforms of existing
federal health programs, and introduces a host of new initiatives
designed to reform the health care delivery system. 3 While the
broad outlines of the ACA reform have been widely discussed,4 the
details of these discemable parts are complex and illusive.5 As the
rigorous implementation calendar unfolds, massive new regulatory
details are both being proposed and in some cases solidified,6
underscoring the complexities of superimposing changes onto the
web of American health care. No doubt there are many vantage
points from which to view ACA, and all of its component parts,
interwoven to form the fabric of universal insurance coverage, as
' M.H.S., J.D. John J. Waldron Research Professor, Loyola University Chicago
School of Law.
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.).
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Introduction to the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5106 (LexisNexis) (June 2010); Peter Grier,
Health Care Reform Bill 101: What the Bill Means to You, CHRISTIAN Sc.
MONITOR, Mar. 22, 2010, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0322/Health-care-reform-bill-101-
what-the-bill-means-to-you.
See generally Jost, supra note 4.
6 See generally HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH REFORM
IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8060.pdf.
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well as those issues that are disparate, singularly reflecting threads
of an array of initiatives. In spite of its enormity, the ACA
legislation does not stand alone but is linked to major changes in
information technology in the Hi-Tech Act and also is part of the
fabric of Medicare, Medicaid, ERISA, and the tax code.7
This essay is not intended to probe the details of the reform
law, other than in the most general way, rather it is written to
consider the process of law that underpins this effort, namely the
role of regulatory procedures as a foundational driver of ACA's
collective reforms. The piece initially will identify the broad
directions that are included in the health reform legislation and offer
a number of reflections on characteristics of the law which are
emerging in statutory implementation. The essay then will consider
the goals of the regulatory process ushered in by ACA beyond rote
compliance with legislative mandates. The final part of the paper
will posit a number of suggestions for reforming the mechanics of
regulations based in large part on current directions in US
administrative law ushered in by Executive Order 13563, and linked
to larger trends in administrative law processes within the context
of what is collectively referred to as new governance.
The Big Picture
On March 23, 2010 President Obama signed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act and subsequently on March 30,
a companion bill of amendments, the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act.8 This massive new legislation package does
many things, but in broadest terms, the law expands health
insurance coverage to 32 million Americans and initiates a series of
reforms affecting both public and private health insurance, and in so
doing revamps the current health care delivery system.9 Within the
7 See WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S NEW HEALTH
CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL, pt. II, chs. 6, 11, 12, 13 (2010).
8 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
9 See id.
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wide spectrum noted, nine areas can be singled out which
collectively capture the spirit of the ACA law starting with what is
arguably the best known provision of the law, the individual
mandate that requires almost all Americans to purchase health
insurance.' 0 Secondly, ACA authorizes the creation of new state
based health coverage networks referred to as health insurance
exchanges, which will provide consumers with various government
sanctioned insurance products." The third major element of the
reform entails a series of private insurance measures that includes a
ban on pre-existing conditions, restrictions on policy rescissions
and limitations on rate increases, broadly expanding federal
oversight in an area traditionally dominated by state law.12 The
fourth focal of ACA concerns wide ranging reforms and extensions
of both the Medicare and Medicaid programs, building on the long
reinvention of these two public entitlements. 13 Fifth, the ACA
legislation contains a wide array of revenue measures designed to
make reform fiscally viable, including thirteen new taxes.14 By far
the most significant fiscal measures in the legislation are ones that
cut Medicare reimbursement to physicians and hospitals, estimated
at reducing those expenditures by $132 billion over ten years.15 The
sixth area of focus in ACA concerns measures that deal with
employers; there are grandfathering provisions in the law which
encourages the continuation of health benefit plans, as well as a
provision that levies penalties against large employers who refuse
to offer health care coverage.16 In the case of small employers tax
credits are offered to underwrite the purchase of employee health
insurance. The seventh general focal point of the health reform law
is the addition of a new, voluntary long-term insurance plan which
provides a cash benefit to assist individuals in two major life
1o 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2010).
" Id. § 18041.
12 Id. § 18001; see also id. § 300gg-12.
13 WASH. POST, supra note 7, at pt. 11, chs. 6, 12.
14 Id. at ch. 13.
" Id. at ch. 6.
16 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2010).
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conditions. Eight, ACA contains a number of provisions that
support wellness approaches to health, and provides a payment
waiver under Medicare for several preventive health measures. 8
The ninth major legislative stream can be categorized under the
broad heading of quality and involves a series of Medicare
reimbursement demonstrations that entail payment reforms that will
spark coordinated care and evidenced based medicine. 19
While broad templates are helpful in garnering a generic
awareness of this law, exploration of the underlying statutory
details in ACA reveals complexities quickly lost in generalities.
Underscoring these complexities is the ambitious programmatic
timetable putting the respective elements of the health reform
legislation into operation, primarily through agency rulemaking
processes. 20 The timetable is a rigorous one as the law mandates
implementation of key provisions of the statute in fairly rapid order.
From 2010 through 2018, 73 measures in ACA must be actualized
by the Department of Health and Human Services through the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, either singularly or in
conjunction with Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue
Service.21 Less than one year after the passage of the law, several
major sets of regulation have been issued presenting a portrait of
the details necessitated by the respective measures in this legislative
scheme. 22
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 30011- 30011-9 (2010).
1 Id. § 300gg-13.
'9 Id. § 1315a.
20 Id. § 280j.
21 Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Implementation Timeline - Kaiser Health
Reform, http://healthreform.kff.org/timeline.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
22 Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience
Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9968 (Feb. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt. 88); see also Medicare Program; Home Health Prospective Payment System
Update for Calendar Year 2011; Changes in Certification Requirements for
Home Health Agencies and Hospices, 75 Fed. Reg. 70372 (Nov. 17, 2010) (to be
codified in scattered parts of 42 C.F.R.); see also Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act: Pre-Existing Condition Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual
352 [Vol. 32:
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Observations
The sum total of the legislation and emerging new
regulations sparks a number of observations about overall
characteristics of this law. Those observations include reflections
on volume, complexity, cost, regulatory absorption and industry
stabilization. At its most basic level, what is striking about ACA, is
the sheer volume of law that has been enacted, and the additional
law that will emerge from implementation, when the statute on its
face is combined with a massive amount of new regulatory
mandates.23 Even in a field characterized by extensive regulation,
the ACA law is striking in its sheer size and commensurate
details.24 No doubt, in and of itself, volume says very little about
the propriety of a law. Indeed volume is the anticipated byproduct
of such a major legislative undertaking, particularly one that
fundamentally alters so much of the landscape of government
health policy. It also follows that in the midst of ACA's voluminous
changes and initiatives, a myriad of ambiguities and questions will
abound, necessitating even more detailed regulatory responses. The
segmented nature of the health sector requires extensive tailoring of
mandates to particular types of providers furthering fueling a need
for details and sparking yet more regulatory mass.
Volume is not without consequence, and the excessive
weight of new and intricate details can become a hindrance to
understanding and implementation. There is very little in the ACA
law that does not raise considerable complexities, and an
exploration of the initial regulatory output that has occurred since
the passage of the law is a ready testament to the intricacies of
Limits, Recissions, and Patient Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 37188 (June 28, 2010)
(to be codified in scattered parts of 45 C.F.R.).
23 Eric Lichtblau & Robert Pear, Washington Rule Makers Out of the Shadows,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/us/politics/09rules.html.
24 See Susan Carhart et al., Fraud Enforcement Top Health Law Issue as
Industry Faces Reforms Uncertainties, 20 HEALTH L. REP. 5, 5 (2011) (noting the
complexities of the 2010 ACA statute).
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enforcement.25 ACA forms a statutory web that is spun around
existing Medicare and Medicaid laws. These laws, in particular,
serve as core building blocks of ACA, and the framework of reform
can only be actualized in reference to existing federal laws not only
dealing with public health insurance, but also laws concerning
employee benefits and taxes. Additionally, health reforms under
ACA must be seen in conjunction with the 2009 Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH).26 The
Hi-tech Act is a critical piece of system infrastructure which places
the federal government at the heart of developing an electronic
medical record system, without which the goals of health reform
cannot be accomplished. 27 Seen together with ACA, Hi-tech
implementation and compliance further muddy the waters of
regulatory complexity.28
State governments play a direct role in ACA through the
creation of health exchanges and the expansion of Medicaid and
clearly in those areas the picture of reform will be shaped by the
nature of regional government responses. No doubt the federal
authorities will provide oversight of state regulatory measures,
pushing for certain uniformity but for political and practical
reasons, some level of state regulatory idiosyncrasies must be
accommodated.29 In addition, as health reform unfolds, the current
25 Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 21.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2010).
27 Id.
28 2010 was a banner year for health regulations as ACA and the Hi-tech Act are
the most viable manifestations of change. For another perspective on an industry
in transition, see Melanie Evans, Gambling on Change, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan.
31, 2011, at 6.
29 Perhaps the most extreme example of state push back on reform is Alaska,
which has indicated it will not seek Federal grants to establish health insurance
exchanges. Alaska's position is more extreme than other states that are
proceeding to implement the ACA law, but no doubt charting their courses in
doing so. See Michael Marios, Alaska Cites Court Ruling in Refusing Federal
Health-Care Money, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 17, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-18/alaska-s-pamell-cites-court-ruling-
in-refusing-federal-health-care-money.html.
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structure of basic state health regulations in core areas such as
licensure, and public health will need to change, sparking further
complexity in the delivery system. Beyond federal and state
regulatory developments, the many health care associations that act
as private regulators must be considered in that the array of ACA
reforms will likely trigger changes in various standards that have
developed in virtually all areas of health delivery. 30 For example,
the increasingly important area of patient safety, deeply embedded
in health reform, is an area that must be linked to both state
regulatory activities, as well as to the dozen or so entities which are
active in setting policies and standards in the area.
Perhaps the most universal concern triggered by the ACA
legislation is that it is over cost. At the macro level the projections
of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that ACA will reduce
the budget deficit over ten years by $100 billion have framed an
ongoing debate surrounding the law.32 CBO projections have been
countered by analysts whose cost evaluations are far more negative
about the long term fiscal realities attached to the law.33 The issue
of regulatory cost is not, however, one that deals only with multi-
year implications, but resides in the more immediate concerns of
employers, insurers, providers and individual consumers about
30 For example, The Joint Commission sponsors a very active program of
hospital accreditation that covers virtually all aspects of facility operations. See
THE JOINT CoMMissioN, 2011 ACCREDITATION PROCESs GUIDE FOR HOSPITALS
(2010). It is likely that a series of changes ushered in by the ACA will eventually
be felt in hospital accreditation, as well as in private sector programs affecting
other providers.
3 Patient safety encompasses an array of public and private efforts that have
resulted in various specifications and guidelines. Among the private actors who
have influenced this field are the National Quality Forum, Institute for Health
Care Improvement, National Patient Safety Foundation, America Society of
Professional in Patient Safety, and The Leap Frog Group for Patient Safety.
32 Cong. Budget Office, Congressional Budget Office-Health Care,
http://www.cbo.gov/publications/collections/health.cfm (last visited June 24,
2011).
33 Jonathon Cohn, The New Republic: The Real Costs of Health Reform,
NPR.ORG, Feb. 7, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/02/07/133560543/The-New-
Republic-The-Real-Costs -of- Health-Reform.
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present financial implications of ACA compliance. Over a long
period reform should lead to a more efficient delivery system with
reduced costs and higher quality, but getting there through the
details of legislative implementation may prove to be costly. 34
Clearly regulators are highly cognizant of cost factors, and
administrative law processes demand considerable financial
assessment of new mandates. However, such efforts generally focus
on given initiatives and do not reflect the aggregate economic
impacts of regulatory compliance across a wide spectrum of
requirements. Furthermore, on an individual rule basis, impact
analyses rest on certain methodologies and assumptions that may
not be shared outside the halls of bureaucracy.35 An example within
ACA of disagreement over regulatory costs can be found in the
divergent analyses concerning the financial impacts of a proposed
rule in the area of hospital reimbursement, namely value based
purchasing, a system of reimbursing hospitals based on
34 Sadly it is difficult to obtain objective economic assessments of ACA as cost
issues are mired in politics. There do, however, appear to be legitimate economic
concerns about ACA that are being voiced in conservative circles. See, e.g.,
Michael Young, The Real Costs of Obamacare, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2010,
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/27/the-real-costs-
of-obamacare; Douglas Holtz-Eakin, American Action Forum, Higher Costs and
the Affordable Care Act: The Case of the Premium Tax, Mar. 9, 2011,
http://americanactionforum.org/sites/default/files/Case%20f/ 20the%20Premiu
m%20Tax.pdf.
3 There is a much longer history of regulatory impact analyses in the
environmental area, but controversy surrounding this process can be found in
Health Care as well. For example, due to pressure from the field, four of six
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) rules for concerning
Medicaid reforms were placed under a Congressional Moratorium. This episode,
chronicled by the Kaiser Family Foundation, demonstrates the level of tension
that can occur in governance that not only splits the regulations and the regulated,
but spills over into inter-governmental disputes. See KAISER COMMISSION ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: OVERVIEW AND IMPACT OF NEW
REGULATION 1, 1 (Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7739.pdf
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performance standards. 36 According to the regulatory impact done
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the value based
purchasing rule would result in an equal number of hospitals
receiving a 1% increase or decrease in payments.37 On the other
hand industry experts projected that the new value based purchasing
initiative would result in 75% of hospitals facing potential loses.38
The disagreement over the impacts of value based purchasing
maybe attributed to the typical jousting between regulator and
regulated, as well as a disagreement over the long term benefits of a
rule taken by government, versus an industry perspective that
projects significant losses in the short term as a result of the new
payment methodology.
A fourth observation that can be made about ACA concerns
whether the provisions of the statute and the unfolding regulations,
taken together with other new and existing mandates can be
absorbed by the field. Simply stated will the health care delivery
industry be able to respond to the continued layering of regulatory
requirements. The challenges of ACA compliance are wide ranging,
encompassing not only health care institutions and providers but
also insurers, employers, state regulators, as well the federal
bureaucracy.3 9 Those issues directly related to the delivery of
patient care will likely be the most challenging new requirements
that emerge in health reform. Not only will providers need to
understand new mandates, but they must harmonize those mandates
with complex and unsettled areas of current compliance, while
achieving their primary mission of providing medical care, in
3 Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Value-Based Purchasing Program, 76
Fed. Reg. 2454 (Jan. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422, 480).
37 Id. at 2487.
38 See, e.g., Caralyn Davis, Medicare Value-Based Purchasing: 75 Percent of
Hospitals Face Losses, FIERCEHEALTHFINANCE, June 30, 2010,
http://www.fiercehealthfinance.com/story/medicare-value-based-purchasing-75-
percent-hospitals-face-losses/2010-06-30.
39 For a broad perspective on ACA's impacts, see generally WASH. POST, supra
note 7.
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situdtions that may be fiscally tenuous.40 While the bureaucracy
may provide guidance for response to individual regulations, as was
noted, regulators are not overly attuned to the collective impacts of
new mandates. 41 There does not appear to have been a particular
focus on the part of either legislators or regulators about how ACA
might impact ongoing, daily operations of the regulated parties or
on how new mandates would be harmonized with existing
regulations; rather, the attention of those promoting ACA has been
on field change.42 There is a danger in a regulatory movement
disconnected from operational realities that compliance occurs
solely to meet mandates and may be accompanied by a lack of
understanding and commitment to systemic change on the part of
the regulated.43 The broader goals of reform underlying ACA
maybe viewed by those in the field as just another in a long series
of compliance requirements; concerns about systemic reform
become matters that reside only in the halls of government.
Over time a certain level of equilibrium is achieved in any
area of regulation in which the regulated grow accustomed to new
mandates and necessary accommodations are made to adjust to
particular changes. It can be argued that as the health sector
responds to new ACA requirements the disruptions to the enterprise
of health insurance and delivery will be lessened, as mandated
changes become incorporated into operations. In point of fact,
however, a major underlying goal of health reform is disruption and
40 For a sense of the wide array of regulatory mandates, see Carhart et al., supra
note 24.
41 Robert Moffit, How to Roll Back the Administrative State 5-8 (Heritage
Found. Ctr. for Policy Innovation & Discussion, Discussion Paper No. 1, 2011),
available at http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/cpidpl.pdf.
42 See generally Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and
Cost Control, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 601 (Aug. 12, 2010).
43 See Ellen-Marie Whelan & Lesley Russell, Why We Need Health Care
Reform, Feb. 25, 2010,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/weneedreform.html
(reiterating reasons for systemic changes).
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the reinvention of the sector." As such, the new regulatory
mandates in ACA, combined with the development of medical
informatics, will deliberately reshape the face of health care in ways
that will cause regulated actors to reform, be absorbed by others, or
disappear from the health care stage.45 Certainly ACA's greatest
structural innovation, the integrated care network known as the
Accountable Care Organization (ACO), is intended to reinvent the
delivery system.46 The business models of the ACO have yet to be
determined but if these new entities emerge as intended, they will
reshape the structural nature of health care in significant ways.47
Disruption via law may be totally warranted, but the impacts of new
oversight provisions should be carefully gauged as sound
governance requires application of methodologies and structures
that are operationally viable. Even the most carefully crafted
regulatory program is subject to unintended consequences and
market absorption of new mandates can occur in ways that may
depart from legislative intent.
4 See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., THE INNOVATOR'S PRESCRIPTION ch. 7
(2009); COUNSEL OF EcON. ADVISERS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR HEALTH REFORM (2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/CEAHealthCare Report.pdf;
John K. Iglehart, Implementing Health reform-An Interview with HHS Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 297 (Jan. 27, 2011).
45 See CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 44, at ch. 3, for an interesting discussion
of business trends in health care written prior to ACA but particularly germane
when viewed in this context. It is difficult to predict what the implications will be
for individual actors as a result of ACA and Hi-Tech but undoubtedly there will
be great changes in the health care marketplace. See Associated Press, Will Safety
Net Hospitals Survive Health Reform?, MsNBC.COM, Sept. 8, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32672409/ns/health-health-care/t/will-safety-net-
hospitals-survive-health-reform.
46 H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 3022 (2009); see also 76 Fed. Reg. 19655 (Apr. 7,
2011).
47 STEPHEN M. SHORTELL ET AL,, BERKELEY CTR. ON HEALTH, ECON., & FAMILY
SEC., POLICY BRIEF: IMPLEMENTING ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS
(2010), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/chefs/ImplementingACOsMay_2010.pdf.
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Any observations about health reform must be made
cautiously as the environment surrounding this initiative is highly
unsettled.48 Political and legal pressures will undoubtedly result in
major changes to the law, and it is not unlikely that the individual
mandate requiring the purchase of health insurance may be
redrafted or possibly eliminated.49 Still, even with many changes in
the wind, it is likely that the eventual shape of ACA will be heavily
imbued with new regulations and procedures, driven by the formats
of legal oversight, and channeled through rule making processes.
Certainly regulation is not unique to health care: other sectors have
undergone dramatic and large scale changes sparked by the
operatus of public authority, with the results being voluminous new
control measures.5 0 But what separates health care from other
regulated sectors is a constant reinvention of structures and
oversight policies driven by the elusive goal of improving quality at
a reduced cost.51
48 See generally Manu Raju, A New Dem Threat to Health Care Law, POLITICO,
Feb. 7, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/49031.html.
49 For a discussion of possible changes, see Ezra Klein, Democrats Should
Welcome Reform of the Reform, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2011, available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-
klein/2011/02/democrats should welcome refor.html.
50 For example, massive new requirements have been legislated changing the
financial services industry under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
51 While the regulation of most industries has changed over time, the health
sector is characterized by frequent changes in the scope and nature of federal
oversights. Perhaps the best example of the size and fluidity of federal health
regulation can be found in the Medicare program. Since its inception in 1965
Medicare has been under continual revision moving from a cost based
reimbursement program into a broad prospective payment structure with
numerous ongoing attempts to link up reimbursement with improvements in the
quality of health care. See Henry J. Aaron et al., Medicare Reform, The Stakes, in
REFORMING MEDICARE: OPTIONS, TRADEOFFS, OPPORTUNITIES ch. 1 (2008).
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Rethinking Process
It may seem obvious to most observers that the goals of
regulation are to implement statutory mandates in a manner that fits
the directive at hand, while meeting the dictates of administrative
law and agency policy. 52 Undoubtedly, crafting rules that are
statutorily compliant requires a highly complex set of decisions to
actualize the law in ways that are transparent, equitable, and
efficient, requiring considerable judgment. The interim final and
proposed rules that have emerged in the ACA context are
noteworthy for actualizing current programmatic mandates.
However, these regulations break no new ground in governance;
rather, they follow well trodden pathways. In fairness it should be
noted that regulators, under considerable pressure to meet
rulemaking timetables and to produce workable and comprehensive
rules, have little time to ponder the merits of reforming
administrative processes. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable at a
point of such major change in American health care to posit the
argument that constructive changes in agency procedures would
yield better, more workable regulatory outputs. The health care
industry in 2011 is too splintered to be effectively regulated by a
one size fits all approach, and there is a danger in an overbearing
uniformity that the creativity and innovation fundamental to the
success of broad reform initiatives such as ACA could be stifled.
The challenge becomes one of identifying viable processes in
ongoing, and new regulatory initiatives like ACA, which are
constructively innovative, and command support from both
regulators and regulated.
Change in administrative process is not a novel phenomena
but an ongoing reality, as is evident from even a casual perusal of
the Federal Register.53 Chief among a number of evaluation
processes is the development of a regulatory impact statement by
agencies, which requires a detailed analysis of major rules, focusing
52 See generally KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL
SYsTEM (4th ed. 2004).
1 Id. at 97.
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on costs, benefits, and approaches to regulation. 54 For thirty years,
the Office of Management and Budget has reviewed agency rules
and currently through its Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) evaluates drafts of agency rules to insure that they
are compatible with overall Administration goals in given areas.5 5
OIRA acts as both monitor and advisor on process issues, as well as
a type of intermediary between government and a regulated
industry such as health care.56
Recently President Obama issued a new Executive Order
13563, "Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review."57
Executive Order 13563 affirms and supplements a prior Executive
Order 12866 that in 1994 had articulated core principles of
regulation which focus on costs, benefits and burdens of regulation.
The 1994 rule may have ushered in process changes, but certainly
did not alleviate private sector anxieties over regulation or spark
major creativity in administrative rule making.58 The more recently
issued EO 13563 represents a recognition that further changes need
to be made in administrative processes and the directive opens up
greater potential for reform of agency procedures. In addition to
reiterating the core principles of regulation issued in 1994, EO
13563 stresses public participation in rule making, adoption of
flexible approaches to regulation, emphasis on the use of objective
54 Regulatory impact statements stem from both statutory and presidential
authorities, and can be generic or targeted in character. See, e.g., Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1102 (2010); see id. § 1302(a); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); Exec. Order
No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
5 CTR. FOR REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS, A BLUEPRINT FOR OMB REvIEW OF
INDEPENDENT AGENCY REGULATIONS 2-3, 16 (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/blueprint.pdf.
56 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President of the U.S.,
Questions and Answers, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg/qa_062205.html (last visited June 28,
2011) (see question 10).
5 Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
58 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
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scientific and technical information in shaping guidelines, and calls
for a retrospective analysis and commensurate modification of
existing regulations. 59 While the responses of given agencies such
as the Department of Health and Human Services to the new
executive order are yet to be realized, it is a significant statement
about the importance of regulatory process revision, and certainly
signals an understanding of the Obama Administration about
longstanding problems in this area of law.
New Governance
What is particularly interesting about EO 13563 is that it
appears to fit into a broader context of comparative regulatory
reforms often referred to as new governance.60 Although it is
difficult to succinctly describe the broad and somewhat eclectic
area of new governance, it represents a growing awareness of the
limitations and propriety of traditional government structures in
framing and controlling a given field, such as health care. 61New
governance has sparked a number of novel approaches to regulation
that move toward much less proscriptive processes; it does not
abandon public mandates, but calls for such mandates to be more
fluid and developed in a far more collaborative and anecdotal
fashion.62 The new governance critics of command and control
processes see traditional administrative law formats as stifling
innovation, in that such processes are rigid and formulistic and can
become impediments to real reform.
59 Whelan & Russell, supra note 43.
60 John Blum, A Revisionist Model of Hospital Licensure, 2 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 48, 52 (2008).
61 Id.
6 For an interesting approach to new governance, see Cary Coglianese & David
Lazer, Management Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC'Y REV. 691. See also Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004): see also David M. Trubek & Louise G.
Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and
Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 539 (2007).
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Among the better known approaches to new governance is
responsive regulation, a system of governance that allows for the
adoption of regulatory strategies that move between the poles of
persuasion and command and control.63 Characteristic of responsive
regulation is a regulatory pyramid that starts with voluntarism at its
base, and moves to market controls, self regulation, oversight of
self regulation (meta-regulation) and ends with traditional agency
rule making.64 Designed by Australian academic John Braithwaite,
responsive regulation rests on the idea that informal interventions to
address matters of governance, together with information feedback
being regularly provided to regulated entities, are more effective
than traditional mechanisms.6 5 Responsive regulation does not
obfuscate the need for public oversight, but rather provides a
continuum of options based on the behavior of the regulated and the
need for greater or lesser direction. 66 Other new governance models
call for public/private partnerships in health care specifically to
foster working collaborations that are directed to service goals for
given populations, and share the commonality of other process
reforms in being tailored and flexible.
EO 13563, noted previously, does not adopt any particular
regulatory reform model that would be recognized in the lexicon of
new governance but rather represents a major departure in
philosophy and potential approach to agency rule making that can
be seen as a starting point for meaningful change in this area. EO
13563 is supportive of developing regulations that are less costly,
promote competition and innovation, plus allows for directives that
are based on performance standards as opposed to specific rule
compliance requirements; all elements seen in various new
governance models. Additionally EO 13563 allows for different
regulatory requirements to be applied to large and small entities,
and in some cases permits the granting of partial or total
63 Judith Healy & John Braithwaite, Designing Safer Health Care Through
Responsive Regulation, 184 MED. J. AUSTL. S56 (2006).
6 Id.
65 Id.
66 id.
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exemptions from various types of regulations. 67 But the Executive
Order will not be a cure all for the ills of the administrative state,
and agencies like DHHS, locked into major legislative
implementation tasks, will likely adopt governance changes
cautiously and over long periods of time.
Assuming that political capital can be expended on
implementing EO 13563 three principles should be adopted in
reforming agency governance procedures; they are harmonization,
integration and performance based regulation. On an individual
basis a given rule may be well-crafted and internally consistent,
albeit complex, but the issue arises as to whether that rule can be
easily harmonized with other mandates across the spectrum of new
and continuing regulations. There is a danger in ACA that the new
administrative law it spawns will be highly siloed, resulting in a
layering of mandates that become virtually impossible for the
regulated to approach in a cohesive fashion. DHHS and the
executive branch through OIRA, may have a broader view of
regulation but such a vision, as yet, is not appreciated at the level of
implementation as providers struggle to meet each mandate as it
arises. There is a need in a reformed regulatory system to work
toward some cohesion in governance that should begin with an
impact assessment that considers how a new set of regulations will
be merged with existing obligations, along with consideration of
how a given directive will impact the daily operations of regulated
parties. Also, regulatory impact evaluations should analyze how a
proposed regulation is integrated not only with other federal
schemes, but also with state law and private control mechanisms. In
turn, authorities, both public and private, should coordinate their
efforts, and each new mandate should be seen in reference to the
full array of regulations already in place. Where possible current
regulatory structures ought to be amended and new frameworks of
control should only be developed when use of present schemes is
not feasible.
67 Id.
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Commentators on new governance have noted that
regulation is no longer a bifurcated matter separating public and
private actors, but rather represents a nodal reality in which various
68
actors interrelate to develop control mechanism.68 The existence of
diffuse pathways of oversight, mixing together various actors,
should be appreciated by traditional regulators, and harnessed in
ways to achieve a more workable and cohesive structure of
regulation.69 For example, in the area of patient safety, as noted
previously, control mechanisms are being developed by public and
private actors alike.70 Under a nodal view, the network of policy
makers, public and private, dealing with safety issues can be joined
together to craft operational standards and enforcement mechanisms
that exist outside the traditional format of agency rule making.7 1
Regulatory processes that combine public and private authorities
can be pushed beyond standards setting and be localized into
operational models that join providers with government, fashioning
integrated responses to legislative initiatives in ways that fit the
needs and capabilities of individual markets. In a more fluid system
of regulations structures such as Accountable Care Organizations
could be guided by general principles, but tailored into distinct and
unique systems via active collaborations rather than a massive rule.
This targeted approach to regulation would be particularly helpful
in areas of implementation based on conceptual models that are
evolving, and have yet to be tested fully, even in demonstration
project settings.72 In fact there does appear to be a certain level of
68 See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary
Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REv. 1 (2008).
69 Id. at 53.
70 See John Morrissey, Patient Safety Proves Illusive, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
Nov. 1, 2004, at 4, 6-7, 24-25, 30, 32.
7 See Burris et al., supra note 68, at 26.
72 The most current example of a conceptual model in health reform is the
accountable care organization. There doesn't appear to be a single model which
captured the concept, and a series of concepts appear to be evolving as
foundation elements to be incorporated in emerging models. See Am. Acad. of
Family Med., Joint Principles for Accountable Care Organizations,
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flexibility present in ACA that in principle allows for certain
innovation and creativity in approaches to crafting reform
initiatives.
An applied approach to regulatory reform would be the
adoption of contracting principles requiring agencies to fashion
control mechanisms, developed specifically for a given regulated
entity. In a sense the regulated would be treated akin to contracting
parties tasked with achieving certain results. 73 Agencies would have
to develop very clear goals about their performance expectations,
but such goals could be crafted on an individual basis, and would
allow regulated parties to shape their own unique operating policies
in meeting government mandates.74 In addition, a performance
specification system could be designed that encourages the
regulated to centralize responses in ways that integrate obligations
and meet the directives of multiple agencies in a uniform fashion.
For example, in areas such as patient safety and quality of care,
facilities could develop a collective response to regulatory oversight
by designing programs that would be goal driven and in turn,
recognized as meeting mandates at all levels of control. In instances
where the regulated falters in its tailored obligations, government
could be more demanding adhering to a type of responsive
regulatory posture, and either specify performance processes or
revert to a more wholesale command and control oversight.75
http://www.acponline.org/advocacy/where_westand/otherissues/aco-
principles-2010.pdf (last visited June 22, 2011).
7 An interesting example of how contractors are mandated to follow general
standards can be seen in the requirements that the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) must follow in evaluating Medicare Administrative
Contractors (MAC). See 42 C.F.R. §§ 421.120, 421.122 (2010).
74 Again, the MAC contracting program can be looked to as a model of using
contracting as a level for control, balancing individual requirements, with broad
performance specifications. See id. § 421.122(c).
7 See, e.g., John Braithwaite et al., The Governance of Health Safety and
Quality, (Austl. Council for Safety and Quality in Healthcare, Discussion Paper,
2005) (providing a detailed accounting of how responsive regulation entails
multiple oversight strategies which can be adjusted depending on the behavior of
the regulated).
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Undoubtedly there are many possibilities for reforming the
processes of regulation that could be directed by the broad goals of
harmonization, integration and performance specification. Even
with liberalization of the attitudes toward regulatory reform in the
executive branch, underpinned by a wave of systemic pressures to
do so, the task of implementing new regulatory processes will be
logistically challenging. The framework of agency governance does
change, but significant departures from existing processes occur
very slowly and are particularly problematic in the face of ongoing
enforcement demands. While political and bureaucratic leaders may
endorse process changes, such changes may be hard to filter
through massive bureaucracies and may lack broad agency
support. 6 In the case of health regulation, changing procedures of
governance in ways that empower the regulated will run counter to
a very strong strain in the law that has grown over many years
which attempts to combat fraud and abuse. There is an increasingly
prosecutorial emphasis in health care oversight which runs counter
to process reforms, and bespeaks of a lack of trust on the part of
regulators posing perhaps the largest hurdle to procedural change. 77
On the other hand, for administrative processes to be revamped in a
significant way, those charged with management over the
mechanics of regulation must achieve a level of confidence in the
new procedures that efficiency in process does not compromise the
capacities to address abusive conduct on the part of the regulated.
76 See James Q. Wilson, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do
AND WHY THEY Do IT (1989); DONALD F. KETTL, BROOKINGS INST.,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: A FIFTH YEAR REPORT CARD (1998).
n The problems of fraud and abuse in health care and the perceptions that the
problem is a large one is not a new phenomenon. Stephanie A. Fox, Fraud and
Abuse Enforcement Expanded, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST, Mar. 1997, available
at http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/397fox.html. For a more recent overview
of federal efforts in fraud and abuse, see Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud
and Abuse Before the H. Comm. on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Labor,
Health, and Human Services, Education and Related Services (2010) (statement
of William Corr, Deputy Sec'y, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2010/03/t20100304a.html.
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Conclusion
The 2010 federal health reform initiative, combined with the
Hi-tech Act and the ongoing juggernaut of health regulation, will
have profound effects on all aspects of health care, as it unleashes a
massive, costly new set of regulatory controls. In the midst of all
this change questions need to be addressed about the soundness of
the regulatory processes within which this reform must move. There
is growing recognition both within health care, and more broadly
across regulated sectors, that current government processes are
overly layered, siloed, costly and ultimately inefficient.7 The
recognition encapsulated in EO 13563 demonstrates that awareness
of regulatory shortcomings has reached the White House and a
template for change has been issued.79 There are possibilities to
revise regulation, embracing the principles noted in EO 13563 by
using approaches adopted elsewhere within the framework of a
broad regulatory reform movement referred to as new governance.
Changes in regulation process will be difficult; in health care such
changes will not only make the process more effective but hold the
potential to add value to the products produced. The goals of
harmonization and integration across regulatory authorities ought to
drive health regulatory changes, and although they can be
actualized in varying ways, one possibility is the use of
performance specifications. Altering administrative procedure will
not guarantee the success of health reform, but failure to make
changes will be both a lost opportunity and a continuation of an
increasingly cumbersome and ineffective administrative status quo.
7 See, e.g., Moffit, supra note 41.
7 The Views of the Administration on Regulatory Reform, Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce (2011)
(statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs),
available at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/imageuploads/Te
stimony_01.26.1 1_Sunstein.pdf
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